multy party system
Inspite of the very often genuine and clearly valid doubts cast on the assumed relationship between multipartism and democracy1, there has not been a very convincing position to the widely believed view that pluralism produces greater opportunity for the evolution of an accountable governance system that subsequently leads to a democratic system. Following this, multipartism, as one of the organisational forms of pluralism becomes a basic requirement of democracy.
In the current wave of the democratization process in Africa and elsewhere in the world, Tanzania introduced legislative reforms in July 1992 on the freedom of political association as a basic framework for the development of multipartism and hence democracy.
Since the institution of those politico-legal reforms, a number of important developments have taken place in the political parties formation process. In the first instance, as of December 1992 there were 34 such political organizations or proto-political parties. Since then the number of these proto political parties have surged and declined. At their peak in 1993, there were 51 such proto political parties. Most of these proto-political have now either ceased to operate or have merged with other relatively stronger ones.
As at May 1st, 1994, 35 or 68.6 percent of the proto political parties had attained the legal requirement for temporary registration as political parties. Of the 35 parties with temporary registration, 13, (that includes the incumbent party which did not have to really undergo the length of the process) or 37.1 percent of them or about 25.5 of the original list, secured full registration. By the standards of other African countries, Zaire for example, the emergence of 51 proto political parties or 13 political parties is not an alarming figure2. It constitutes a worrisome statistics nevertheless because, implicitly it is indicative of fragmentation of an already weak polity that is characterized by fragile and small duplicate institutions.
Initial questions and concerns raised by observers of the changes towards plural politics in Tanzania were directed towards this proliferation of the political parties. The question was: would proliferation enhance democracy or would it stifle it. In the views of J.K. Nyerere, an hitherto defender oft he single party system, the proliferation was not positive for the development of democracy3. Other observers regarded the trend as normal and in fact expected. They attributed the proliferation of the parties to an expression of popular outburst of every opinion that throughout the monolithic period remained bottled up. This view also suggested that in due course, these different voices will, like river streams, converge into forceful currents of political expression4.
A second important aspect in the development of multipartism in Tanzania is the continuation of the legacy of monopolistic politics and culture that characterized the past 30 years or perhaps the whole history of Tanzania's existence. We are saying this because traditional Tanzanian politics were not governed under the multiparty political framework nor was colonial Tanganyika or Zanzibar. The last 3 or so years of power transfer from colonialism to independence via elections under a multiparty framework concealed the colonial authoritarianism which still dominated and regulated the political process.
In any case, going by the current developments, this monolithic legacy has expressed itself in Tanzania in a number of ways. One of the ways is the lack of what other people have referred to as political platform5. This simply means the failure by the opposition groups to develop programmes which appeal to the popular groups. There is thus no alternative that is provided by the new political parties. There is still only one political agenda in Tanzania even with the proliferation of the parties.
Another way in which the monolithic legacy still looms high is, for lack of a better term, resignation of society. We are here referring to the patient acceptance by society of undemocratic unjust and dehumanizing actions of those in power committed against civil society. Perhaps such a position would have been explainable under the monolithic regime. But it defies imagination to observe that in a like manner, under the emerging pluralism and with the emergence of new action institutions such as the new parties, society accepts with reverence, official deceit, official corruption etc.
Thirdly, looking at the formal institutions, for example, the administration, the legislature, the judiciary and down to organizations of civil society, the important norm of multiparty politics that requires that each of these institutions check on the conduct of the other hardly exists. The norm is typical of the monotholic regime whereby all the institutions are fused into a single system through a network of patron/client relationships. In the rare and daring event where a judge for example stands up to defend the rights of a supposed offender of the state, this judge is likely to be branded as unpatriotic and subjected to demeaning remarks by politicians or state officials. If an independent paper or lone soul sticks out to reveal abuses of power the paper is threatened with clauses and the individual with court or straight police action. Surprisingly, in the context of all these, society remains numb and actionless even when the efforts of these institutions and individuals amount to their attainment of greater freedom.
Another aspect in the development of multipartism in Tanzania is the large amount and now endemic conflict within particularly the new parties, especially conflict among and between the leaders of the parties. The leadership conflict which began within one of the founding parties, the Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD) in late 1993 has now spread out into virtually all the new parties. Now, the conflict has gone further down the party hierarchies whereby ordinary members fight some of their leaders.
Referring to the leadership conflicts, the Registrar of Political Parties once attributed them to five reasons, two of which accord with our own. These he singled out as being (i) incessant desire to monopolize power and (ii) unmandatedness of the leadership through popular arrangements6.
Certainly, conflict is a recognized modality in the existence of an organization. It is thus not unusual for an organization to experience conflict. There are however two important aspects to conflict in an organization. First, the conflict should not be endemic in the sense that it is so persistent that it impares the organization from pursuing its goals. Secondly, the organization must have a mechanism for conflict resolution which does not jeopardize the very existence of the organization. What appears to be the case with the new political parties in particular is that the conflicts are repetitive and subsequently disrupt the organization itself. As a result of conflicts even the previously more promising new parties have experienced defections of some of their able leaders. It is in such incidents that the Registrar of Political Parties attributed the conflict to acts of sabotage and/or fight over funds given to parties by the government to meet elections costs. In other cases the parties have disintegrated and in yet other situations mass purging of members has been attempted7. In yet even more other cases uneasy mergers have been tried out between splinter groups.
There are a number of other specific trends in the move to multipartism that involve the parties themselves which we cannot mention in the introduction here but which we have extensive time for later. We have mentioned some of these features now as a basis for our next attempt at building a framework within which we can explain the process to multiparties and democracy in Tanzania.
Understanding the Nature and Character of Tanzania's Transition to Multipartism and Democracy in Contemporary times
The issues that we have raised earlier force us to stand back and try to explain the unique character of Tanzania's transition to multipartism and democracy in both historical and theoretical terms. The basic question is what factors of a historical experiential and theoretical type explain for example the lethargy of civil society and their organizations in exploiting the political space provided to stand up to injustice? What explains the extreme weakness of the political parties, etc.?
Historical Explanations
We attribute the unique character of Tanzania's transition to multipartism and to democracy and the form it takes first to historical experience related to the nature of the political regime.
First is the Party System. On this point, mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) differs substantially with conditions in Zanzibar. But of course, in some way Mainland Tanzania has for some years after the union of the two parts influenced conditions in Zanzibar along the Tanganyika line.
The point is, Tanganyika has not really experienced competitive party politics save for the brief period, 1958-1960, for elections to the legislative council and then in 1962 for the presidential elections.
Even during this brief period, there was a predominance of only one party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which attained for itself the mantle of a nationalist party at the top of which was the national hero. What indeed this meant was that the Tanganyika society did not have the opportunity to grow into the principles and skills of competitive party system on areas such as: the establishment of a variety of political platforms and a variety of competing parties; development of mechanisms that link parties and civil society; development of independent leaders; articulation of dissenting positions; development of a competitive culture; building of an independent organization etc. Thus, the historical fact that real competitive party politics has not taken place in Tanganyika has left behind a legacy of a culture of monolithic politics: singular party system, limited opposition etc.
This position was enhanced after independence in 1963 with the political decision by the then National Executive Committee of TANU and later on in 1965 with the legal provision for the establishment of the one party system and prohibition of competitive party politics. The political processes that accompanied this step was the building of patrimonial structures. Virtually all organizations of civil society, including churches, the mosque, academics, workers, professionals etc. had their independent views suppressed, on the one hand, but the regime was fast to patronize them through their incorporation into the party system. Thus all the would have been organizations for independent thinking and action were drawn into the party system with promise of or actual reward allocations in terms of appointment to lucrative offices and some private benefits in exchange for loyalty and political support.
For Tanganyika therefore this historical legacy appears to have left behind a culture of uniform thinking, uniform political organization and the rest such that the transition to multipartism and plural democracy becomes essentially a cultural transformation. And like any other cultural issues, the monolithic cultural legacy sticks around for a long time so that multipartism in Tanzania is to the present only in the legislation form. Society is yet to change. It is multipartism without parties.
In the case of Zanzibar, the situation is slightly different. Unlike Tanganyika, the transfer of power process went through real competitive politics albeit a perverse one. Perverse in the sense, first, it was based on a colonial framework whereby parties and society had to wage a two pronged fight. The first struggle was to wrestle power from a system (colonialism) which by definition, while allowing struggle against it through competition or otherwise was unwilling to give up power. That we may designate as vertical struggle waged against all its institutional forms of control, racism, repression etc. Different parties had different positions in this vertical struggle. There were those that colonialism gave easy terms to e.g. the Zanzibar Nationalist party (ZNP), because their possible eventual victory was considered to be able to deliver positive results for colonialism. But there were those other parties such as the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) whose possible victory had already been considered to produce adverse results to the colonial system. For such a party, the vertical struggle was a heavier burden. Unlike Zanzibar, to a great extent, Tanganyika party politics essentially entailed the vertical struggle.
There was then what we may designate as the horizontal struggle whereby the different party organizations and their various political platforms contested for power between themselves. So while those parties may have been united in the Vertical struggle, they stood opposed in the Horizontal one. In this regard it is the Horizontal and not the Vertical struggle which produces proper competitive politics. It entails competition among possible equals. It provides for opportunity among equals to evolve different individual agendas and platforms etc. In Zanzibar such possibilities existed and different groups albeit creatures of institutional colonialism competed on more or less equal terms.
In any event, competitive party politics in Zanzibar existed and was tested in many more elections since 1957 than in Tanganyika. Thus the parties developed capacity to organize, capacity to articulate a position, capacity to stand up to the opinion of the other etc.
When after the 1964 revolution the party system was changed, still the legacy of competitive politics was not lost. So that in present times, when legislation for multipartism was effected, there is more political activity in Zanzibar than in Mainland Tanzania. In Tanganyika, multipartism in contemporary times has actually meant one party playing against itself. In Zanzibar there may be clear contending forces.
But by and large, whether one looks generally at what is happening in Tanzania, the legacy of the single party system has left a foot mark which may take quite some time before it fizzles out and stops to adversely influence current efforts of creating multipartism and plural democracy.
The second influencing factor is the ideology of monolithic politics. This is a factor of the post independence period. Although active only since 1967 to late 1970's, the ujamaa ideology, much as it may claim a series of scores, in another sense it went on to reinforce the structures of the monolithic system. Centrism as an aspect of ujamaa may have facilitated national integration. But it also meant control and regimentation. Political association outside the single party system was disallowed as was the articulation of dissenting ideas. How can, with mere legislation for multipartism people who were under such a system create own leaders, their own organizations, or build their own political platform? Thus, clearly this is an important contributory factor to the nature of multipartism in Tanzania.
The state system is a third factor. The bureaucratic and authoritarian colonial state was replaced at independence by a post colonial dependent state. The dependent state presented itself in the Tanzanian case as developmental (the economic entrepreneur), a benevolent guardian of citizens' property and life. Embedded in the monolithic structure there was no conception of human or political rights. It was assumed that all these would benevolently be provided for by the state.
The result of this state system therefore is firstly, institutional underdevelopment. The different branches of the state did not grow to undertake their individual functions. Power was fused. Power was also exercised in a discretional way. Secondly, citizens' political institutions could not emerge.
These three factors are a heritage which today has an influence on the nature, character and form of transition to multipartism and democracy in that people are used to obey the state and revere their leaders. They shun demanding their rights. Civil society stands weak in front of the state. It lacks appropriate institutions to defend itself with.
Suggesting those factors does not mean that Tanzania has not undergone transformational processes that have altered the factors. Indeed this has taken place. Among the crucial change agencies of the Tanzanian socio-political system one has been education. Immediately after independence, Tanzania embarked upon an educational programme that raised the literacy rate in 1982 to more than 80%. Ideally education should raise the competence levels of civil society which should in turn enable them to come out of and challenge authoritarian regimes and demand political and civil rights. Indeed this has happened and domestic pressure that facilitated the achievement of at least the formal legal right to political association is in part explained by this factor. But by and large it may be worth noting here that education can be used to either control and stifle initiative or it can be used to enlighten. In the Tanzanian case the literacy rate did not facilitate the attainment of the liberating function. Since the media was excessively controlled, education led society deeper into domination through exposure to only formal and official literature.
The media is of course the other transformational force but unfortunately, as just noted earlier, this organ was excessively controlled such that knowledge which ought to have been derived through the media was not forthcoming.
Urbanization has been an important change elsewhere particularly when this has been associated with industrialization resulting from economic development. Urbanization allows the concentration of population in towns and cities. The population, apart from the economic benefits which arise from demands placed on them, make communication and association easier and hence also promote political activity. Tanzania's rate of urbanization has gone along with the promotion of a unique urban culture. First, the urban population are supported by a very weak economic base such that any politics that arise are the politics of survival. Secondly, through programmes such as repatriation and villagization, influx of towns has not been rapid. Thus urbanization has not really promoted the political process to multipartism.
The factors we have discussed have formed a legacy that in one way explains the particular nature and character of Tanzania's transition to multipartism and democracy.
Inspite of the observation by the Registrar of Political Parties in Tanzania that almost all the fully registered political parties in Tanzania had a leadership crisis, there was some indication at a general level that there were at least some parties that demonstrated a large measure of viability. But recent headlines in papers about the crisis in the Civic United Front (CUF), the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi) and the Popular National Party (PONA) all of which subsequently sent shock waves into the Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) which was to spearhead a merger of a cluster of other parties have made other observes ask in utter frustration: How can we explain all these empirical developments in Tanzania's Transition to Multipartism and Democracy?
One of the ways to respond to this is to look at the factors as we discussed earlier and relate them to what is taking place. The answer there as we have already alluded to is to say that the monolithic political heritage is so deeply rooted in society that any attempt to shape and reshape the old structures and institutions are counter balanced by those factors so that no meaningful transition is taking place. As it can be observed this explanation does not give one foil satisfaction and hence the need to look elsewhere for some theoretical explanation in which to situate and interpret what is taking place.
The kind of issues emerging in the Tanzanian's Transition to multipartism are not unique to Tanzania. The observations we have already raised have also been observed elsewhere9. Naturally therefore many other observers have tried to explain them in theoretical terms. Hereunder are some of those explanations.
The Modernization Perspective and the Transition to Multipartism
(a) Huntington and Issues in the Transition to Multipartism
One of the pioneer explanations is offered by Samuel P. Huntington (1991) in his article. Democracy's Third Wave10. The thrust of Huntington's article, first, is that the democratization process consists of long waves shaking up and restructuring authoritarian regimes. Each of these waves is followed by a reverse wave so that only some of those shaken up authoritarian regimes remain democratic while others fall back to authoritarianism. The significant point here about the democratization process which must be derived from Huntington's formulation is that there are long time factors attached to the democratization process whereby actions and counter actions take place until the process stabilizes. Looking at the present process Huntington sees it in its third democratization wave after the first of 1820-1926 and the second of 1948-1962 and is wondering whether the process is "...early in a long wave, or at or near the end of a short one". He is also wondering if the third wave will come to a halt, or will it be followed by a significant third reverse wave!".
The second important concern of Huntington's article is to explain the democratization process: What gives rise to the forward process and what explains the backsliding? With regard to the forward process Huntington sees five important factors contributing to the third wave: (i) the deepening legitimacy problems of the authoritarian regimes; (ii) economic growth of the 1960's which led to the emergence of pro-democracy groups induced by increased education and hence political awareness; (iii) transformation of the doctrine of national catholic churches from"... defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism..."; (iv) the role of external actors (the EEC, USA and USSR) as both inducers and sustainers of democracy and; (v) the demonstrations effect (Snow balling) of earlier transitions in stimulating and providing models for subsequent democratization process.
Against the factors that explain the forward wave, Huntington presents seven factors that explain the backsliding in the first two democratization processes and which possibly could explain the possible third reverse wave. These are: (i) weakness of democratic values among key elite groups and the general public; (ii) severe economic setbacks; (iii) social and political polarization; (iv) determination by powerful classes (conservative, middle and upper) to exclude from political power populist and leftist movements and lower class groups; (v) break down of law and order; (vi) intervention or conquest by a non democratic foreign power; (viii) reverse snow balling triggered by the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in other countries11.
Several important factors can be derived from the above in explaining both the forward and reverse democratization process. First is the correlation of economic factors with democracy. It is suggested in Huntington's formulation that robust economic performance enhances democracy while poor economic performance hinders it. Secondly, the domestic social groups outlook as defenders or opponents of democratic ideals and values contributes or hinders the process. Thirdly, like the domestic social groups, external actors may promote or hinder the democratization process. Finally, Huntington suggests that there are specific cultures (Western Cultures) that promote democracy while others are incompatible with it (Islam, Asian, Confucianism).
As we noted earlier on Huntington's formulation is about the transition to democracy in general. It was not intended to address specific cases as we are attempting here. Nonetheless the broad features that Huntington presents may be important in discussing the specific issues situated in the theoretical perspective that informs Huntington's discourse on the transition, that is the modernization perspective.
(b) The Modernization Perspective and the Transition to Multipartism
In a very summarized way, as per modernization theory, first, the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy constitutes progress or modernization. One feature related to this modernization process is the change from monolithic forms of governance such as single party regimes to multiparty regimes. In this regard therefore the fact that Tanzania now, even though only formerly, has adopted the multiparty system is a step towards progress. Secondly, the modernization perspective delineates specific attributes for democracy one being the presence of plural institutions. In this regard it is not only many parties that are supposed to be created but also there is need to develop and promote a variety of independent and autonomous civil institutions and groups that can adequately influence the governance process. The institutions themselves, and this includes political parties, must have clearly defined goals with an elaborate set of rules which emphasize efficiency in the achievement of their objectives. A second attribute of democracy as per modernization perspective is the attainment of specific democratic culture. The components of such a culture include emphasis upon the individual versus the groups, emphasis upon rights versus responsibility, preference for competition and disagreement instead of cooperation and harmony. Egalitarianism, voluntarism, scripturalism and respect for hierarchy have to be replaced by individualism, objectivism, secularism and rights against the state. In this regard Huntington specifically points to Western culture (which embodies the values mentioned) as the bedrock of democracy. He also considers other cultures such as Confucianism and Islam as incompatible with democracy because they are founded on the opposed values as enumerated.
As per this second attribute of democracy, the modernization perspective would argue that what we observe in Tanzania in terms of the resignation of the civil society, the continuation of the single party legacy, the predominance of authoritarianism in the state and new parties structures is related to the weakness or prevalence of undemocratic values among the key elite groups and the general public. This, as Huntington points out, is one to the critical factors that causes the backsliding of the transition to democracy.
A third attribute of democracy is economic development. In Huntington's own words:
...Most wealthy countries are democratic and democratic countries - India is the most dramatic exception - are wealthy. The correlation between wealth and democracy implies that transitions to democracy should occur primarily in countries at the mid-level of economic development. In poor countries democratization is unlikely...12
This position has led other exponents of the modernization perspective to further suggest that the low level of economic development of Third World countries such as Tanzania leads their societies to unique forms of politics whereby there is intense competition for the control of state power because such control facilitates access to the limited resources which characterizes low levels of economic development13 (Barongo). From this understanding both the inter and intraparty conflicts would be seen as competition for the means that would lead one to control over resources.
All in all, the political party in a democracy is conceived of as a complex entity with the following specific attributes:14
(a) The internal structures are predominantly specific, that is
- The functions are clearly defined, regularized and specialized.
- There is a hierarchy of control extending downwards from national to regional, to district, to local levels, rural and municipalities.
- Development of a core of functionaries for all hierarchical levels.
- There is division of labour that grows downwards to such roles as vote organizers.
(b) The party links up with the general public through a series of objectives which have a general appeal.
(c) Members owe their allegiance to the party (not the party leader).
(d) The party leader is an expert in
- propaganda,
- education,
- organizational techniques, and,
- mass persuasion.
These party leaders are derived from wo/men who have displayed superior skills in specific roles but also qualified to play diffuse (wide/all purpose) roles.
Because of the specific conditions of Third World Countries, the modernization perspective suggests that political parties in these societies depict the following attributes:15
(a) the internal structures are predominantly diffuse;
(b) the strength of the movement is based on securing parochial and ethnic support;
(c) members owe their allegiance to a dominant leader who often is the founder of the party.
By inference therefore, the political parties in Tanzania are likely to depict those qualities that pertain to Third World conditions transition to a modern party which will therefore entail movement from this position to the one characterized earlier.
The formulation by Huntington and other analysis in the Modernization school does certainly help to understand the current efforts at democratization and their problems. However there are important observations which one is always bound to raise when it comes to any treatment of a phenomenon by this perspective. One of the issues often raised is on the association of democracy with particular cultures. It may not be easy for anyone today to conclusively determine what kind of values man is going to depict in the years much ahead of the present generations to enable us to conclude that all or perhaps only some societies will attain democracy as conceived by the perspective. But one is certainly safe to suggest that it is unlikely that for many years to come the world will all turn Western and therefore attain democracy. In that regard this view of democracy and the prerequisite towards it sound in the interim ideological. It does not give room for peoples based governance structures which take into consideration other institutional possibilities based on other cultures.
It is on the score of this problem that Huntington for example runs into great difficulty when dealing with what he refers to as the past Asian Model or the "Confucian democracy" which he admits is a contradiction in terms, because the central value of Confucianism, that is, the maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy runs in conflict with Western Cultural Ideals. The inclusion of Japan into the group of countries that he considers as democratic is a clear contradiction because characteristic of Confucian Societies it has been in office through many years of dominant party with hardly any competition. So probably, contrary to the Modernization perspective democracy can be constructed on the basis of varied cultures.
The second issue is whether or not the perspective is adequate enough to explain the observations raised. Certainly this is another limiting aspect of the perspective. For example, one is left to wonder why the so called transition to democracy in Africa in contemporary times is clustered around the early 1990's and not before or after it. Is the demonstration effect of say what happened in the former Soviet Union enough to explain the timing, the institutions that developed or why other societies resisted it todate? One could go on to serialize other problems of the perspective. Suffice it to suggest through the two examples that the perspective as a framework with which to explain both the general transition and observations about the new political parties in Tanzania by itself is not adequate and an alternative or complimentary framework may be required.
The Dependentia School and The Transition to Multipartism
Our search for another theoretical framework leads us into identifying the Radical Dependentia School as a possible viable framework within which to explain the general transition and the specific political process in Tanzania16.
(a) Dependentia and the origin of the current Political Processes
From the Dependentia School of thought, the present political processes in the Third World and in Tanzania in particular need to be located within the economic and political processes of the World Capitalist System. It is suggested that the economic crisis in the core of the capitalist system which took place in the mid to late 1970's sent shock waves throughout the Third World Countries which are organically linked to the core countries. For countries of the core, to recover from the crisis meant searching for investment possibilities in the Third World Countries where there was cheap market for labour and raw materials and potential market for manufactured commodities. For countries in the periphery, particularly those in Africa, after the failure to generate their own sources of capital with which to revamp their shattered economies, turned to the multilateral capitalist financial institutions of the IMF and IBRD for credit to stabilize and finance long term economic projects. Supported by capitalist donor countries the multilateral capitalist institutions constructed Recovery Programmes variously called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) through which countries of the core undertook the reorganization of the economies of and subsequently the political systems of peripheral countries to accomplish their own recovery purposes.17
(b) SAP and the Economic and Political Reorganization of the Third World
SAP as an economic programme therefore required the liberalization of respective economies in Tanzania and elsewhere so that gates could be opened to foreign investors as well as their domestic allies. The result of various economic policy actions such as privatization, commercialization, removal of market controls etc. among others, created a hierarchy of participating classes and social groups. In the Tanzanian case this meant the reconstitution of foreign European and Indian based companies previously nationalized after 1967. Internally the previous commercial class of Indian and Arab origin reconstituted to take advantage of the new economic arrangement. Then emerged local (indigenous) enterprises who began to learn the new state of art. These classes were organically and hierarchically linked whereby what may be referred to as the commercial bourgeoisie (mainly Asians and Arabs and some Europeans) became representatives in Tanzania of the core countries industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. They mainly became commercial agents and representatives of foreign companies engaged in construction, marketing of products, mineral prospecting, hotel and wild life tour companies etc.
Below this hierarchy of the top layer of the class, was the lower class. First of agricultural producers who now were to rehabilitate the traditional agricultural export commodities sector. There were also the labourers in the mushrooming private businesses. Finally were the unemployed who serviced the new system either as street traders of excess commodities dumped in the market, the "Machinga's"18 or cheap food retailers "Mama Nitilie"19 to feed the mass of employees who cant make ends meet.
According to the Dependentia formulations the SAP economic phenomenon shook the foundation of the bureaucratic and political bureaucracy in so far as the state economic sector in which they were founded was delinked from it. This process was accompanied by the need to also liberalize the political sphere. Economic liberalization had to go hand in hand with political liberalization whereby the international bourgeoisie demanded policy change for the conducive operation of the liberal economy. The liberalization of the political sphere by and large required the institution of competitive politics which would now enable the business elite of all shades to participate without restrictions. It also meant designing policies that would promote business such as freeing up labour from the state (otherwise referred to as retrenchment) so that business can benefit from its skills at no cost in training or payment of terminal benefits.
The Dependentia Formulation would also argue that both the economic and political reforms have generated conflict and struggles in each sphere and between them. At the economic level in Tanzania such conflict has revealed itself between local and foreign businesses, between African (indigenous) and Asian and between Tanganyikans (Mainland Tanzanians) and those from the Isles. So nationality, race and regionalism has been the manifestations of conflict and struggle in the economic sphere.
While the conflict at the economic level may be seen as essentially economic in character, at the political level the struggle is first and foremost about the need to control the state. Having lost its grip over the economic resources previously provided by the state economic sector, there is now more incessant struggle to control the state through which one can accumulate resources and enrich himself. This is more manifest among the various layers of the present political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie. But also those previous members of the political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, who for some reason fell in the disfavour of the then political regime and were removed are using the new opening provided by political liberalization to contest for the control of the state as a means through which they too could eventually use it to accumulate and enrich themselves.
The conflict at the political sphere has assumed many forms over past few years: (i) inclusive accusations of official corruption by members of the political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie; (ii) inconclusive regionalist and segregationist resolutions such as the Tanganyika nation, construction of blocks among the political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie e.g. the case of the G55, Zanzibaris Vs Tanganyikans; (iii) gate keeping by the regime in power so that those outside do not enter etc.
(c) Dependentia and Multipartism in Tanzania
According to the Dependentia formulation, it maybe fair to say that SAP programmes have challenged the authoritarianism of single party regimes such as the one that existed in Tanzania. It may be equally true to suggest that this shake up has unleashed new energies that could further assist in the regime transformation.
However, the Dependentia school doubt as to whether or not what is taking place resembles the construction of a multiparty system in Tanzania. They certainly suggest that definitely it is far away from the building of a democracy in Tanzania. They argue, as a basic starting point, that what SAP programmes and attendant policies have done to Tanzania and African countries in the present epoch is to disagregate the hitherto different factions of the political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie that was previously constituted into the single party system, into various factions each with relative power to compete with the other in the struggle of control of the state and economy. As one class they are united in their relationship with the international bourgeoisie and the masses of their society. In their relationship with the international bourgeoisie they are committed to promoting dependence structures both economic and political because they stand to secure some benefit out of that arrangement. So also in their relationship with the masses they are committed to excluding them from effective participation in the economic and political processes because that arrangement assures them extraction of surplus to the metropole, some part of which they will retain.
Thus the Dependentia school argues that political Party formation process in present times is in fact a regrouping of the different factions of the political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the age of Structural Adjustment Programmes into organs of struggle. In other words what is taking place is not transition to multipartism whereby one would see the emergence of for example alternative and different political platforms, different organizational and methodological approaches etc. but a breakdown of the class into various factions: which is the same thing as a breakdown of the single party into its various subgroups.
With regard to the observations on the trend in Tanzania we can infer from the Dependentia school, the following:
(i) Different factions of the same political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie looking for the opportunity to capture state power for its own use via the newly founded multiparty channel.
(ii) The fiercest factional struggle in this regard is between the faction in power organized around Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and their erstwhile 'comrades' in the party and government but now outside it, organized around the numerous opposition political parties and groups.
To protect its major means for accumulation of resources and personal wealth, the faction in power will not concede to political transformation that will lead to popular participation or to inclusion of the faction that is outside it. It will in turn use the power in its hands to suppress any such verbal demands as constitutional conference or participation in the management of the transition.
(iii) Because it does not have access to the instrument of resource accumulation, that is the state, the faction outside the regime in power is therefore not likely to have any impact in its demands for more share in the political and economic process.
This means therefore that relative to the faction in power, the faction outside it, is prone to easy manipulation which can lead to their break up through party bursting, infiltration or directly through state action.
(iv) But being part and parcel of the political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, former or present, their relation with the masses is far from being mutual. In fact, the general masses are, as is the case in Tanzania, likely to either dismiss the factions with scorn, withdraw from participation in the political process or completely resign from it.
(v) Other powerful organizations/groups e.g. the business elite are likely to prop up the faction in power through contributions and the like in return for policies that favour their position. When occasion permits, this group may want to occupy the political saddle themselves.
From the above, we consider the Dependentia School formulations as a better framework which can explain what we have observed about multipartism and democracy in Tanzania. We are going to employ this framework to discuss the subjects in the other chapters.
